Most large corporations in the United States were once run by individual capitalists who owned enough stock to dominate the board of directors (board of directors: 董事会) and dictate company policy. Because putting such large amounts of stock on the market would only depress its value, they could not sell out (sell out: v.卖完, 出卖, 背叛) for a quick profit and instead had to concentrate on improving the long-term productivity of their companies. Today, with few exceptions, the stock of large United States corporations is held by large institutions—pension funds, for example—and because these institutions are prohibited by antitrust laws from owning a majority of a company’s stock and from actively influencing a company’s decision-making, they can enhance their wealth only by buying and selling stock in anticipation of fluctuations in its value. A minority shareholder is necessarily a short term trader. As a result, United States productivity is unlikely to improve unless shareholders and the managers of the companies in which they invest are encouraged to enhance long-term productivity (and hence long-term profitability), rather than simply to maximize short-term profits.
Since the return of the old-style capitalist is unlikely, today’s short-term traders must be remade into tomorrow’s long-term capitalistic investors. The legal limits that now prevent financial institutions from acquiring a dominant shareholding position in a corporation should be removed, and such institutions (省略了SHOULD BE) encouraged to take a more active role in the operations of the companies in which they invest. In addition, any institution that holds twenty percent or more of a company’s stock should be forced to give the public one day’s notice of the intent to sell those shares. Unless the announced sale could be explained to the public on grounds other than anticipated future losses, the value of the stock would plummet and, like the old-time capitalists, major investors could cut their losses only by helping to restore their companies’ productivity. Such measures would force financial institutions to become capitalists whose success depends not on trading shares at the propitious moment, but on increasing the productivity of the companies in which they invest.
89. It can be inferred from the passage that which of the following is true of majority shareholders in a corporation?
(A) They make the corporation’s operational management decisions.
(B) They are not allowed to own more than fifty percent of the corporation’s stock.
(C) They cannot make quick profits by selling their stock in the corporation.
(D) They are more interested in profits than in productivity.
(E) They cannot sell any of their stock in the corporation without giving the public advance notice.
我的问题有两个：
1）89题中的majority shareholders 是什么意思？是仅仅指股份占50％以上的股东？还是指股份占相对大多数的股东（比如说现在15%-20％就算是大股东了）？还是两个都可以指？
2）(A) They make the corporation’s operational management decisions.为何不对？原文如下
to dominate the board of directors (board of directors: 董事会) and dictate company policy.
og的解释是：majority shareholders can actively influence a comapny's decision-making, but it does not suggest that this influene is equal to the absolute authority suggested by the language of this answer choice. The passage also does not discuss the "operational management decision" of corporations.
但我觉得dictate company policy 也和A选项是同义变换。另外我没有否认C选项的正确性，只是问如何排除A选项。 | 
