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1.1.4 check支付方式
第一段:
说现在电子化的支付方式很多,但是paper check 还是很受欢迎,占80%什么的
第二段:
讲paper check多说明市场不健康,似乎稍微讲了点原因
第三段:
重点说这个paper check的弊端吧,writer怎么样怎么样,可是拿利息,不用承担什么什么风险
第四段:
驳斥了上面的理论,说现在对一些大的check,第三段里讲的吃亏的那一方也是rational的,会争取利益。它给出了原因,1因为技术提高2 当量较大时,receiver可以采取行动以减少float产生的损失--和writter商量
题目:
1. 作者提到了现在因为科技的进步,支票的签发与兑现很快了,是为什么
答:是为了说明支票从开出到兑现产生的float的经济效益没有这么大了
2. 对那些支持第三段中老观点的人来说,以下哪个选项是正确的?
答:因为某种原因支票的使用只带来社会成本,而不会给支票使用者带来成本,所以他们一直用。(Since individuals and businesses don’t face that higher social cost)
3. 从这个文章可以infer出支票接受者对支票产生的check float的态度?
答:支票接受者会通过谈判来保护自身的利益(也就是要求分享check float)
4. 这篇文章的主旨是什么?
答:解释了为什么支票一直还在使用的几个原因
Despite the growing availability and acceptance of electronic payment instruments —such as credit cards, debitcards, and automated clearinghouse (ACH) payments—by far the most popular noncash payment instrument used in the United States is the paper check. In 1995, approximately 80 percent of all noncash transactions were made by check (Bank for International Settlements, forthcoming). Furthermore, although use of electronic instruments has grown in the past several years, check use has grown as well: between 1987 and 1993, the average annual number of payments per capita increased by 26 payments for electronic instruments, but by 31 payments for checks (Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala, forthcoming). Clearly, individuals and businesses are not rapidly shifting away from checks to electronic instruments.
The popularity of checks persists even though checks cost society more to produce and process than do electronic instruments. According to standard economic theory, that may be a sign that the market for payment instruments is not working properly. In general, in an efficient market, when competing goods are available and one costs society more, the prices of the goods will reflect the relative costs of the resources used to produce them, and the cheaper good will be substituted for the more expensive. In this way, society uses its resources to produce only the particular goods it wants in the particular amounts it wants. In other words, resources are used efficiently. When use does not shift to the cheaper goods, either the goods are not close substitutes or the market has failed, and there is a potential role for a public authority to attempt to correct the failure.
Market failure is a commonly accepted view of what’s happened in the market for payment instruments. According to this view, the users of checks are the check writers. And for those individuals and businesses, the private cost, or price, of using checks has been distorted by the value of check float, or the time between the writing and clearing of a check. During that time, of course, the funds can earn interest for the check writer rather than for the check receiver. The size of this benefit is thought to have reduced the price of check use below the cost to society of producing and processing checks. Since individuals and businesses don’t face that higher social cost, they continue to use checks despite the existence of other means of payment that are less costly to society. In short, checks are overused.
The main reason for this new conclusion is that the value of float for all checks has decreased significantly since the Humphrey and Berger (1990) study. I estimate that, in real terms, between 1987 and 1993, the value of float for an average check payment dropped from $1.04 to $0.09, or about 90 percent.
The reasons for this dramatic drop in the value of float are primarily greater efficiency in check processing and lower short-term interest rates. Both the labor and capital involved in check processing became more efficient between 1987 and 1993. During that time, for example, the Bank Administration Institute (1994) estimates that check encoding labor productivity at commercial banks, measured in items encoded per hour, increased about 24 percent. Over the same period, the productivity of readersorters (the high-speed equipment used to process checks), measured in items processed per hour, increased 18 percent. These productivity increases have expedited check clearing. At the same time, the amount of interest that float allows check users to earn shrank considerably. For example, between 1987 and 1993, the average three-month secondary market U.S. Treasury bill rate fell about 50 percent, from 5.78 to 3.00 percent (FR Board, various dates).
That view is suspect even if the data still supported it, though. The view seems to assume that only the agent on one side of a transaction—the check writer—recognizes and takes advantage of the value of float. That assumption doesn’t correspond with expected rational behavior. Since float is a transfer payment from the check receiver to the check writer, with no allocative effects overall, rational agents are likely to negotiate a mutually beneficial distribution of any significant value of float. And, in fact, this type of negotiation is common for large payments between businesses, for which the value of float is potentially large. In practice, many business-to-business payments contractually stipulate payment transaction terms that internalize the effects of float. |
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