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美国的苹果业
第一段：从1890 到1930年，苹果的交易发生方式发生了变化。美国1890年前的苹果都是在东部种植的，果农和buyer是面对面的，将苹果卖给near customers。后来，到这段时间的末期，苹果种植移到了太平洋沿岸，运到东部就很费时间，而且加州的苹果商越来越多，苹果都是加州生产，果农有了大量的甚么东西（类似于订单之类的，有一题的迷惑选项提到了这个）。苹果商多了之后，他们的产品卖到很远的各州。一联邦通过了法律，主要有几点：苹果质量标准由政府制定，苹果质量可以在发运前由政府人员评估，供需双方的合同，包括合同的修改都受法律制约。
第二段：苹果的质量变得不好。如果顾客发现苹果质量不好，果农和分销商都有责任；可能苹果本身质量不好，也可能是运输中损坏了苹果。这样就有人钻这个空子（卖质量不好的苹果），然后扯皮，贿赂官员。
第三段：政府机构等给予装货前就核实质量，规定什么时候可以改动贸易条款，主要是因为在一个供需双方众多的市场里，信用已经不足以维系公平的交易环境，比如卖方可以短斤缺两，然后把责任推给铁路；而买方可以借口收到的苹果比合同约定的质量差而要求折扣。所以政府需要介入这样的交易。当然，商人的信用(reputation)一定程度上会防止他们成为投机分子，但是由于participants很多，还是有必要regulate和核实质量。
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1) 主旨题： （Discuss the impetus to regulation。
2) 1890年和1930年交易方式有甚么不一样了？ （果农不能直接把东西卖给buyer了。）
3) 细节题：这个act的产生原因有哪些？
4) 文章所描述的opportunist 会做什么事情？ （明明是质量不好的苹果，非说是装运时是好的。）
5) participants 多，往往不能保证buyer 和seller 的reputation，下面哪个情况能说明这一点？ （运输公司的责任导致货物损坏。）
6) 70年代，apple industry除了哪个外，都是发生了的变化？
7) 细节题：苹果种植在这个时间段先后的变化，第一段定位，我选的是种植的地区少了。
8) 文中提到另一个法规有什么意义？
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Between 1890 and 1930, the U.S. apple industry underwent a profound transformation. At the beginning of the period, apples were produced in a scattering of orchards through the Midwest and East, near consumers; commercial apples were sold in face to face transactions. At the end of the period, apples were grown commercially in a handful of orchards in the Midwest, the East, and, most importantly, in the Pacific states, and shipped to distant consumers. Commercial apple transactions became anonymous, taking place between buyers and sellers separated by long distances. By 1930, apple sales relied on federally legislated marketing institutions. Quality was specified by federal grading standard, and third party federal inspection services were available to verify quality prior to shipment or after delivery. Standard business practices were dictated by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, which clearly specified when buyers or seller could change contract terms, and the procedures they were required to follow when altering contracts.
An alternative interpretation is that government involvement in apple marketing was a response to contract-enforcement problems arising as a result of the emergence of the national apple industry. Selling a perishable commodity over long distances was inherently problematic. First, quality declined naturally during the transcontinental delivery. Second, both farmers and the railroad, through their actions during packing and shipment, could accelerate this natural deterioration. Together, these two complications made it possible for sellers to claim to have shipped high quality fruit and for buyers to claim that delivered quality was low regardless of actual quality. Verification of these claims was impossible. The inability to detect whether reports of low delivered quality resulted from a random act of nature, inattention, or fraud left room for rent-seeking activity and opportunistic behavior.
Although the desire to avoid the negative consequences of a bad reputation encourages sellers and buyers to behave honestly, it may be impossible to develop a reputation when there are many buyers and sellers in the market. In such cases, when informal institutions become difficult to sustain, government or industry institutions may emerge. Quality certification and industry-defined minimum-quality standards are both effective methods for transmitting quality information from sellers to buyers. (Contract Evolution and institutional Innovation: Marketing Pacific-Grown Apples from 1890 to 1930) | 
