Q9 to Q12:
In its 1903 decision in the case
of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the
Line efforts of three Native American tribes
(5) to prevent the opening of tribal lands
to non-Indian settlement without tribal
consent. In his study of the Lone
Wolf case, Blue Clark properly
emphasizes the Court’s assertion
(10) of a virtually unlimited unilateral power
of Congress (the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate) over Native
American affairs. But he fails to note
the decision’s more far-reaching
(15) impact: shortly after Lone Wolf, the
federal government totally abandoned
negotiation and execution of formal
written agreements with Indian tribes
as a prerequisite for the implemen-
(20) tation of federal Indian policy. Many
commentators believe that this change
had already occurred in 1871 when—
following a dispute between the
House and the Senate over which
(25) chamber should enjoy primacy in
Indian affairs—Congress abolished
the making of treaties with Native
American tribes. But in reality the
federal government continued to nego-
(30) tiate formal tribal agreements past
the turn of the century, treating these
documents not as treaties with sover-
eign nations requiring ratification by the
Senate but simply as legislation to be
(35) passed by both houses of Congress.
The Lone Wolf decision ended this
era of formal negotiation and finally
did away with what had increasingly
become the empty formality of obtain-
ing tribal consent.
