Q9 to Q12:

In its 1903 decision in the case

of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the United

States Supreme Court rejected the

Line efforts of three Native American tribes

(5) to prevent the opening of tribal lands

to non-Indian settlement without tribal

consent. In his study of the Lone

Wolf case, Blue Clark properly

emphasizes the Court’s assertion

(10) of a virtually unlimited unilateral power

of Congress (the House of Represen-

tatives and the Senate) over Native

American affairs. But he fails to note

the decision’s more far-reaching

(15) impact: shortly after Lone Wolf, the

federal government totally abandoned

negotiation and execution of formal

written agreements with Indian tribes

as a prerequisite for the implemen-

(20) tation of federal Indian policy. Many

commentators believe that this change

had already occurred in 1871 when—

following a dispute between the

House and the Senate over which

(25) chamber should enjoy primacy in

Indian affairs—Congress abolished

the making of treaties with Native

American tribes. But in reality the

federal government continued to nego-

(30) tiate formal tribal agreements past

the turn of the century, treating these

documents not as treaties with sover-

eign nations requiring ratification by the

Senate but simply as legislation to be

(35) passed by both houses of Congress.

The Lone Wolf decision ended this

era of formal negotiation and finally

did away with what had increasingly

become the empty formality of obtain-